This paper investigates the relationship between dividend payouts and corporate investment. We find significant heterogeneity in the relationship across firms -heterogeneity that helps reconcile competing results in the literature. Drawing on financial filing data from Compustat, we first broadly replicate the statistically significant negative relationship estimated by Auerbach and Hassett (2003). We show that this relationship does not hold if the variation is restricted to within-firm only. Our null results suggest a relatively precise zero estimate for the mean firm. Next we investigate heterogeneity in the relationship between dividends and investment. Using quantile regression methods, we find that this negative relationship is concentrated at the top of dividends distribution: only firms from the 70 th percentile and above exhibit a strongly negative relationship, and it is these firms that drive the negative estimates of pooled OLS regressions reported in prior work.
INTRODUCTION
What is the relationship between dividends and investment? Tax or other policy that impacts profit distribution may reduce cash-on-hand and thus corporate investment -an important driver of real economy outcomes like firm and worker productivity. This paper attempts to better understand the relationship between dividends and corporate investment by moving beyond estimating mean dividend behavior conditional on investment. We find that there is significant heterogeneity in the relationship across firms -heterogeneity which helps reconcile competing results in the literature.
Recent work by Yagan (2013) shows that the 2003 dividend tax cut and subsequent surge in dividend payouts failed to increase corporate investment. Prior studies over longer time horizons have found that either no significant relationship exists between investment and dividend payouts (Fama 1974, Smirlock and Marshall 1983) or that they are negatively related -that is, when corporate investment rises, dividend payout declines.
These studies, such as Dhrymes and Kurz (1967) , and more recently Auerbach and Hassett (2003) , Desai and Goolsbee (2004) , and Korinek and Stiglitz (2009) focus on mean behavior. We find that estimates of average firm behavior belie significant heterogeneity. Using data from firm financial filings reported in Compustat we reconcile the findings of Auerbach and Hassett (2003) with the more recent quasi-experiment based evidence of Yagan (2013) and show that even over a long time-horizon the negative relationship between dividends and investment is driven by cross-sectional correlation and not the over-time within variation that drives the quasiexperimental results.
The relationship between dividend payouts and corporate investment is of interest to policymakers and economists alike. Recent years have seen both reductions and increases in dividend tax rates, each time sparking debate on how these tax rates affect investment incentives.
Empirical investigations by Chetty and Saez (2005) , Blouin, Raedy and Shackelford (2011) , and Edgerton (2012), among others, have shown that the 2003 dividend tax reduction led to higher dividend payouts. The ultimate impact on investment-the "real-economy" outcome of interest-of these higher payouts hinges on whether firms finance marginal investment projects with equity issuances, debt, or retained earnings -and, in the last case, how lower retained earnings affects investment. Understanding how corporate investment directly relates to profit distribution can help policymakers better appreciate the ultimate impact of policies that affect payouts. 1 Drawing on financial filing data from Compustat we investigate the relationship between firm dividend payouts and investment levels. First we broadly replicate the statistically significant negative relationship estimated by Auerbach and Hassett (2003) . We show that this relationship does not hold if the variation is restricted to within-firm only-that is, the previously estimated negative correlation is an artifact of cross-sectional variation. Our results yield a relatively precise zero estimate for the mean firm. Next we investigate heterogeneity in the relationship between dividends and investment that examining means alone could mask. Using quantile regression methods we investigate how the relationship varies across the distribution of dividend payouts. Estimates of the average firm's behavior belie significant heterogeneity. We find that this negative relationship is concentrated at the top of dividends distribution. Firms
1 !Retained earnings may indeed play a prominent role in financing marginal projects. As stated in Bradford (1991) "most corporate equity capital is generated by internal investment rather than new share issues." Between 1980 and 1985 more than two-thirds of gross investment by U.S. non-financial corporations was internally financed. While the financing of the marginal project need not match the average financing patterns, the stark pattern is suggestive. from the 70 th percentile and above exhibit a strongly negative relationship-it is these firms that drive the negative estimates of pooled OLS regressions reported in prior work.
This more nuanced picture of how dividend payouts relate to corporate investment has several implications. Policymakers may view measures likely to encourage dividend payouts differently given that it is in fact high payout firms that exhibit a strong negative correlation between payouts and investment. Policies that encourage dividend payouts may actually reduce corporate investment if retained earnings are the primary source of financing for marginal projects for these firms. They will also produce windfall gains at infra-marginal firms. Under weak assumptions, both of these effects imply net welfare losses. Finally, as the relationship between profit distribution and corporate investment is related to the "new" view vs. "old" view debate of the impact of dividend taxes, our results suggest that while some firms do indeed exhibit the negative relationship characteristic of the "new" view others, particularly less investment intensive, lower dividend firms, may be better described by the "old" view; in other words, retained earnings may be a more important source of funds for some firms, but not for the average or even typical firm.
DATA AND SAMPLE
We utilize data from Compustat North America (Annual Fundamentals), a database that provides annual financial information on publicly traded firms in the U.S. and Canada. Each firm's information is reported at the end of its fiscal year, giving us an unbalanced panel with one observation per firm per fiscal year. 2, 3 Compustat data are available back to January 1950 but
we restrict our sample to fiscal years 1964 through 2011 4 since data is scant prior to 1964. 5 We exclude Canadian firms, as well as firm-year observations in which a firm underwent a major merger or reorganization. We also exclude firms in finance, insurance, and real estate, which have two-digit North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) codes of 52 or 53. 6 We drop firm-year observations with missing values for any of the variables used in our analysis.
The main variables used in our analysis include total common / ordinary dividends (DIV it ), investment spending (INVEST it ), cash flow (CASH it ), total firm value at the end of the previous fiscal year (VALUE it ), and total debt (DEBT it ), where i indexes firms and t indexes fiscal years.
Investment equals capital expenditures. Cash flow equals after-tax income plus depreciation.
Value is the value of the firm's common stock. Debt is the sum of the firm's financial obligations, including short-term and long-term debt. We divide all variables by the firm's total assets at the end of the previous fiscal year to adjust for scale. We winsorize all of these variables at the one percent level in order to limit the influence of outliers. 7 In all our regressions, we lag the independent variables (INVEST it , CASH it , VALUE it , DEBT it ) by one year. In some specifications, we utilize a set of 10 investment bins, or indicator variables based on the deciles of lagged investment (INVEST i,t-1 ). As additional controls, we We also construct a set of ten firm size dummies based on assigning firm-year observations to asset deciles within each fiscal year. Finally, we construct a set of fiscal year dummies.
Our full sample consists of 170,183 firm-year observations. Summary statistics for this sample are given in Table 2 . Note that for more than 60 percent of these observations, dividends are zero. However, many of these zero dividend observations represent firms that have never paid a dividend; these are likely to be young firms. Thus, following Auerbach and Hassett Table 3 . Among the mature sample, less than 30 percent of the observations have zero dividends.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGIES AND RESULTS
Building on Auerbach and Hassett (2003), our goal is to study the relationship between current period dividend payouts and lagged investment, conditional on firm value and cash flows. It is also important to control for the firm's initial level of debt, to measure debt capacity and thereby account for the possibility of using additional borrowing as a source of funds.
We begin by estimating ordinary least squares (OLS) and Tobit regressions on both the full and mature samples. Our basic specification is as follows:
Here, the financial variables are as defined in the previous section, YEAR t is a fiscal year fixed effect, INDUSTRY it is an industry fixed effect, and ε it is a stochastic error term. The Tobit regressions adjust for the fact that there are a large number of zero-dividend observations (censored observations), particularly in the full sample. The results from these basic models are presented in Table 4 . The standard errors are clustered by firm.
The first four columns of In addition to the specifications presented in Auerbach and Hassett (2003), we test the robustness of the model to firm fixed effects by estimating the following equation:
These results are shown in the final two columns of Table 4 ; in these regressions, we include firm fixed effects. The regressions also include size dummies. The estimated OLS coefficient on investment is negative in both the mature and the full sample, but is insignificant in both specifications. 9 This suggests that the Auerbach and Hassett (2003) result is driven by variation in investment across firms, not within firm. This has important implications for understanding the dividend behavior of firms and sheds light on which factors are important in driving the relationship found by Auerbach and Hassett (2003) . Rather than high investment crowding out
dividends for any given firm, the negative relationship estimated in the prior literature is driven from comparisons of high investment firms that paid lower dividends to low investment firms that paid larger dividends.
These basic linear models provide insight into the impact of investment on the conditional mean of dividend payments, but do not help us characterize the distribution of dividend payments. We first explore nonlinearities in the relationship between investment and dividends along the distribution of investment using a simple, straightforward method. We create a set of indicator variables for the ten deciles of investment and use these in place of the linear investment variable in the regressions from Table 4 . We then plot the coefficients on the 10 investment bins, along with 95 percent confidence intervals.
These plots are shown in Figure 1 for the mature sample and Figure 2 for the mature sample with fixed effects. In both cases, the omitted bin is the first decile of investment, and therefore its coefficient is set to zero. In Figure 1 , relative to the first investment decile, dividends are significantly lower throughout the distribution. However, they increase between the 2 nd and the 7 th deciles of investment, then decrease beyond that. They are significantly lower at the 10 th decile of investment. This pattern suggests a non-linear relationship between dividends and investment, indicating that the Auerbach and Hassett (2003) result of a negative relationship is primarily driven by firms that paid high dividends and made large investments. While the inverse U-shaped pattern is replicated in Figure 2 with firm fixed effects, the differences across investment bins are generally not statistically significant. This suggests that the negative correlation between dividends and investment estimated in Auerbach and Hassett (2003) is driven primarily by between-firm variation -it's not that firms that invest heavily then pull back on dividends; instead, firms that invest heavily pay smaller dividends than low-investment firms.
Building off the simple method of binning investments, we estimate conditional quantiles functions (Koenker and Bassett 1978, Koenker and Hallock 2001) to study the heterogeneity in the relationship between lagged investment and dividend behavior with more structure. We seek to model the conditional quantiles (e.g., percentiles) of firms' dividend payments as a function of observed variables, in particular the lag of firm investment. An advantage of using quantile regressions is that its estimates are more robust to outliers than OLS. Further, if the response variable is subject to censoring, the conditional mean is not identifiable without additional distributional assumptions, but the conditional quantile is usually identifiable.
We therefore estimate a quantile regression model. We estimate standard errors for the coefficients using bootstrapping, taking account of between-quantile blocks. This allows us to test and construct confidence intervals comparing coefficients describing different quantiles.
Results from the quantile regressions on mature firms are shown in Tables 5 and 6. Table 6 estimates the quantile regression with fixed effects. Table 5 shows that for the middle and higher quantiles, the estimated relationship is negative and significant. At very high quantiles, dividend payments are strongly negatively linked to investments. (Bottom quantiles are censored.)
We also present these results graphically in Figure 3 . Figure 3 shows the results from our quantile regressions on mature firms, without fixed effects. The figure highlights the stark contrast between the linear relationship that we obtain using OLS, which fits the conditional mean, as opposed to quantile regression, which fits the conditional quantile.
Our results suggest that the "new view" may not apply to all firms, and that whether the "new view" or the "old view" is correct varies across firms depending upon where they are in the dividend distribution. Our results also imply that OLS estimates do not tell the whole story due to varying effect of investment at different points in the dividend distribution. Table 6 and Figure 4 present the results for a quantile regression with fixed effects, for mature firms. The estimation is done using the methodology described in Canay (2011). Though the lowest quantiles are censored, the non-conditional quantiles of the dividend payout distribution are not affected. For firms in the middle of the dividend distribution, i.e. those in the 40 th to the 60 th percentile, the estimated coefficient is not significantly different from zero. For the higher percentiles, the relationship between dividends and investment is negative. In other words, our results indicate that the negative relationship estimated with the use of the OLS model in Auerbach and Hassett (2003) is being driven by firms at the high end of the dividend distribution. The quantile regression approach suggests that the relationship is in fact, non-linear.
The weight of the evidence of our investigation suggests that the focus on the mean of dividend payments in Auerbach and Hassett (2003) , conditional on lagged investment, masks the non-linearity in the relationship between investments and dividend payments. With the use of quantile regression techniques as well as a simple bins model instead of a linear investment variable, we have found no evidence that dividends react negatively to investment at low levels of investment, while we have found evidence that dividends do react negatively at high payout and high investment firms.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Understanding whether dividend payouts slow corporate investment, whether by drawing down cash on hand or otherwise, is important to understanding the ultimate "real economy"
impacts of policies that affect the way corporations compensate their investors. Recent natural experiment-based evidence from Yagan (2013) shows that the uptick in dividend payouts following the 2003 dividend tax cut did not lead to increased corporate investment. Regression evidence over longer time horizons (rather than following a single tax policy change) like Auerbach and Hassett (2003) suggest that dividends and investment are negatively related-that higher payouts go with lower investment-for the average firm.
We reconcile these two findings by showing that the negative relationship between dividends and investment in mean analysis is entirely an artifact of cross-sectional variation.
Within-firm OLS results show a precisely estimated zero. While on average firm dividend payouts have no statistically discernible relationship with investments, pooled and fixed effect quantile regression results reveal that this mean behavior masks considerable heterogeneity.
Fixed effect quantile regressions show that low payout firms (firms below the 30 th percentile of dividend payouts) actually exhibit a statistically significant positive relationship between lagged investment and dividends, though these quantiles are censored. For these firms higher payouts follow more investment. For firms in the middle quantiles, the estimated coefficient is not significantly different from zero. High payout firms, on the other hand, exhibit a negative relationship between dividends and lagged investment. Higher payouts follow slack investment.
Our findings strongly suggest that the focus of earlier work on mean behavior missed important non-linearities in the relationship between investments and dividend payments. With the use of quantile regression techniques as well as a simple bins model using ten deciles of investment instead of a linear investment variable, we have shown that dividends react positively or nonnegatively to investment at modest levels of investment, and negatively at high levels of investment.
If the relationship between dividends and investment differs for firms at different points in the dividend payout distribution, our consideration of policy options may need to be more nuanced as well. For high-payout firms it appears that dividends come at the cost of investment.
Policies that encourage dividend payouts may actually reduce corporate investment if retained earnings are the primary source of financing for marginal projects and these firms are the source of most marginal investment. When policymakers are concerned with weak corporate investment, encouraging payouts may be a costly policy choice. If high payout firms are choosing payouts to reduce wasteful spending by management, then they are paying for their poor corporate governance with lower investment levels. Further work that can shed light on whether poorly governed firms make bigger payouts and then invest less could help us better understand the operational consequences of poor governance driven dividend payouts.
At the same time it appears that low investment and moderate-payout firms boost dividends and investment in short succession; when they can afford to invest they can afford to pay dividends. If these firms are simply making payouts to satisfy investors and lower the cost of their primary source of capital-that is, equity is their marginal source of investment capitalthen reducing dividend tax burdens on these firms may in fact boost investment. On the other hand, if these firms are using dividends to signal their quality any policy that encourages payouts will simply add more noise. Given the non-linear relationship between dividend payouts and investment, we may need to give more careful thought to all measures that affect payouts and the types of firms they are likely to affect. Research that can help us better understand why start-ups and other small firms pay out dividends can inform how policy can best avoid distorting their investment choices. 
